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Can neuroscience inform economics?
Rationality, emotions and preference
formation
Nuno Martins*
The interaction between neuroscience and economics has gained much prominence
recently, leading to the emergence of the new and expanding field of neuro-
economics. I will argue that, although there is much insight to be gained from the
interaction between neuroscience and economics, the implications of recent
developments in neuroscience and neuroeconomics for the deductivist methodology
of mainstream economics, and its emphasis on prediction of events, have not been
sufficiently addressed. In fact, much research on neuroeconomics has contributed to
the formulation of deductivist models aimed at the prediction of events, when the
more fruitful use of neuroscience in economics consists rather in the utilisation of its
insights for the development of an explanation of social behaviour that moves
beyond the mainstream deductivist methodology. The somatic marker hypothesis,
developed by Damasio and others working closely with him, will be suggested as an
alternative framework for conceptualising the emergence of social behaviour from
a neurobiological substrate.
Key words: Neuroscience, Deductivism, Preferences, Open systems, Somatic marker
hypothesis
JEL classifications: B41, D01, D87, I31
1. Introduction
Important advances in the study of the human brain have been made in the last few
decades. These advances have been enabled by progress in brain imaging techniques, and
clinical evidence gained through the study of patients with localised brain lesions. By
bringing these advances from neuroscience to economics, neuroeconomics has provided
a richer conception of the human agent. However, in so doing, the main proponents of
neuroeconomics have not questioned the essence of the methodology of mainstream
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economics, which can be best characterised as a commitment to mathematico-deductivist
models, as Lawson (1997, 2003) argues. The fruitfulness of the approach adopted in
neuroeconomics, where neuroscience is used to complement the mainstream models of
economic agency, will be critically scrutinised. I will argue that neuroscience can be more
fruitful if used to describe the neurobiological structures from which social behaviour
emerges, and not to predict behaviour using mainstream economic models, and that the
somatic marker hypothesis, developed by Damasio and others working closely with him,
can be most useful in this regard.
Also, research on the links between neuroscience and economics has been concerned
with diverse topics like preferences, trust or decision making under risk and uncertainty,
and no conception of the economic agent that successfully integrates these different
branches of research has been provided yet. I will argue that the somatic marker hypothesis
can be most helpful in order to achieve an integrated conception of human behaviour.
2. Rational choice theory and mainstream microeconomic theory
There are two dominant approaches in contemporary rational choice theory, which in turn
underpin mainstream microeconomic theory. In the first of these approaches, we start by
defining a set of axioms, from which a preference ordering is obtained. This preference
ordering reflects self-interest, and can be represented by a utility function. It is also
assumed that actual behaviour, and ‘rational’ choices, will be driven by such preference,
which is the ‘rational’ preference.
In the second approach, instead of starting from a set of axioms from which a preference
ordering that explains choice is obtained, we start from observed choices instead, and infer
an underlying preference ordering that is consistent with those choices. This is the
approach that underpins Paul Samuelson’s (1947) theory of revealed preference since, in
this approach, an underlying preference ordering is inferred from observed behaviour, and
rational behaviour is defined as any type of behaviour that is consistent with the revealed
preference ordering.1
Sen (2002) notes that even though these approaches have opposite starting points, both
are committed to the postulates that there exists a single and complete preference ordering
that characterises rational behaviour, and that actual behaviour mimics rational behaviour
so defined. Furthermore, not only does this unique preference ordering drive choice, it is
also supposed to reflect the chooser’s well-being, as Sen (1982) argues.
Sen (1982, 2002) criticises mainstream rational choice theory, and the mainstream
microeconomic theory grounded on the latter, for failing to recognise that human
behaviour cannot be described in terms of a single complete preference ordering only.
Sen (2002) notes that human behaviour may be driven by motivations other than self-
interest, such as social commitment, moral imperatives and conventional rule-following,
and argues that not all of these motivations can be described by the same preference
ordering. Furthermore, Sen argues that preference orderings need not even be completely
specified. Limited information, value conflicts, or the need to act before the judgemental
process has been made, may lead to incomplete preference orderings.
Moreover, authors like John Elster (1983), Martha Nussbaum (2000) and Sen (1982,
1985, 2002) have also noted that preferences often get adapted through time. But in
mainstream economics, preference orderings are typically taken to be stable, or if
1 See Vivian Walsh (1996) or Amartya Sen (2002) for a discussion.
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adaptation is acknowledged as a possibility, no mechanism is provided to explain how
adaptation takes place.
Sen (2002, p. 42) argues that the assumptions on rationality that characterise
mainstream economics are made in order to ensure the possibility of prediction of events.
In fact, Sen considers the prediction of events to be the main goal of mainstream
economics, and argues that the notion of rationality that underpins mainstream economics
is subsidiary to this goal.
The problems identified by Sen spring from a more general problem that underpins
mainstream economics in general, and not just microeconomic theory: the use of
a methodology that presupposes a closed system conception of the social realm. According
to Tony Lawson (1997), closed systems are systems in which constant conjunctions of the
form ‘whenever event X then event Y’ occur. Open systems are those in which such
constant conjunctions do not always occur. The models of rational behaviour criticised by
Sen presuppose the existence of closed systems, otherwise the predictability of actual
behaviour that such models aim for would be impossible. Following Lawson (1997), I will
name the mode of explanation where regularities of the form ‘if event X then event Y’ are
a necessary condition as deductivism.
The use of deductivist models where there is only one possible (rational) choice for
human agents seems in fact to be the central characteristic of most mainstream economic
theory, and allows for the predictability of events that Sen mentions. Mainstream
economic theorists are often open to competing explanations of human action, allowing
not only for different conceptions of ‘preference’, ‘welfare’, ‘utility’ and ‘self-interest’, but
also for models of human behaviour that include such notions as social rules (e.g.,
evolutionary game theory models where strategies are sometimes interpreted as social
rules, and other models of social interaction).
But it is a common characteristic of mainstream economic models that whatever
explanation is provided for behaviour, the latter must rely upon closed system regularities,
which are obtained either by assuming a complete preference ordering that can be
represented by a utility function, or by other mathematico-deductivist techniques which
enable prediction of actual behaviour (e.g., by supposing that human agents engage in
constrained optimisation or maximise some objective function). Even when uncertainty is
considered, it is modelled by assuming that agents know the probability distribution of the
various possible scenarios (leading to a conceptualisation of uncertainty which contrasts
with Keynes’ 1936 conception, for example, in which uncertainty consists in the absence
of knowledge of the probability distribution of future events), or resorting to other
assumptions that facilitate mathematico-deductivist modelling.
In this sense, economic theory is characterised by a concern with deductivist modelling
of actual behaviour (within which the explanation of behaviour in terms of a complete
preference ordering is one possible form). What is essential to mathematico-deductivist
models is the use of a framework that presupposes closed systems, and because it
presupposes the constant conjunctions that characterise closed systems, can be used
(successfully or unsuccessfully) for the prediction of events, regardless of whether it is ever
used as such.
3. Neuroeconomics and the mainstream methodology
Neuroeconomics positions itself as a discipline that goes beyond mainstream economic
theory by taking into account the role of different motivations, and does not explain
Can neuroscience inform economics? 3 of 17
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behaviour solely in terms of a single complete preference ordering. Camerer et al. (2005)
argue that the tendency to neglect the role of emotions and a variety of motivations in
mainstream economics can be explained in part by the scepticism that authors who had
a central role in the development of mainstream economics (e.g., William Stanley Jevons,
1871) expressed about the possibility of studying human feelings in any way other than
through the observable effects of those feelings. They argue that recent developments in
neurobiological research enable us to overcome some of those limitations, and propose the
advancement of the new and expanding field of neuroeconomics in this regard.2
Neuroeconomics is thus described as a new field that aims at a conception of the human
agent where the latter is driven by a multiplicity of motivations.
As Glimcher et al. (2008, p. 7) note, there are two main trends in neuroeconomics, one
concerned with using ‘brain-imaging as a tool to both test and develop alternatives to
neoclassical/revealed preference theories’, and another trend concerned with using
‘economic theory as a tool to test and develop algorithmic models of the neural hardware
for choice’. This second trend has provided much insight to the neural functioning of the
human brain, and to the neural correlates of such concepts as preferences or subjective
utility, whereas the first trend has been concerned with using knowledge from neuroscience
in order to improve economic models and economic predictions. In fact, Camerer (2007)
argues that neuroeconomics, by providing a more complete characterisation of human
motivations, will also enable a significant improvement of economic predictions.
However, a question that could be asked is whether this type of interaction between
neuroscience and economics, where the added value of neuroscience consists in the
improvement of economic predictions, really enables a conception of the human agent that
goes beyond the mainstream approach to rationality and behaviour. In much of the
research under the heading of ‘neuroeconomics’, especially in the type of research
concerned with improving economic predictions, the way in which neuroscience has been
used in order to inform economics consists essentially in using knowledge about the human
brain, and about the role of emotions, in order to formulate models of behaviour that
assume different preference orderings, which correspond to different brain states.
Nevertheless, since the models that are developed are still deductivist models, aimed at
prediction of events, a complete preference ordering, or other closure conditions, are still
assumed for each brain state. For example, Bernheim and Rangel (2005) develop a model
where a ‘hot’ (emotional) state is described by a preference ordering that is different from
the preference ordering that underpins a ‘cold’ (rational) state, and Romer (2000)
distinguishes between ‘feeling-based mechanisms’ or ‘thinking-based mechanisms’ when
proposing the formulation of deductivist models.
But for each brain state (e.g., ‘hot’ or ‘cold’ states, based either on ‘feeling-based
mechanisms’ or ‘thinking-based mechanisms’), there is a complete preference ordering that
enables the prediction of human action or other similar conditions that presuppose a closed
system. Each brain state is described using the mainstream deductivist methodology
(assuming, for example, single, complete and unchanging preferences for each brain state
when defining payoff-functions or utility functions in general), presupposing closure
conditions that are a necessary condition for a deductivist methodology.
Hence, much of the research on ‘neuroeconomics’ does not really lead to a change in the
dominant mainstream paradigm, since it is still concerned with the prediction of actual
events that Sen identifies as the main aim of rational choice theory and (micro)economic
2 For a summary of which see Glimcher et al. (2008), Sanfey et al. (2006) or Camerer et al. (2004, 2005).
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theory, which in turn is grounded on a vision of ‘economic theory’ that, as Lawson argues,
presupposes closed systems, so that deductivist modelling can proceed. In these cases,
there is not an abandonment of the mainstream deductivist methodology, but rather an
expansion of this methodology.
Of course, knowledge of the role of emotions in changing a given brain state will no
doubt help in improving economic predictions. Furthermore, neuroeconomics has
provided many contributions to the study of how neural mechanisms influence prefer-
ences, choice and subjective well-being. But the enrichment of economics using
neuroscience is constrained, rather than facilitated, by the belief that the knowledge
achieved in neuroscience must be combined with the mainstream deductivist methodol-
ogy. We find an extensive use of the mainstream deductivist methodology when modelling
human behaviour in what Glimcher et al. (2008) call the first trend of neuroeconomics, and
the implications of recent developments in neuroscience for the mainstream deductivist
methodology have not yet been addressed within neuroeconomics in general.
In fact, note that even if a given neurobiological (or neuropsychological) structure were
identified, the activation of such a structure would deliver predictable results only under
closure conditions. But if the act of choice is influenced by multiple structures in the
context of an open system (where we are unable to discriminate the relative contribution of
each particular structure or substructure), exact prediction of behaviour will not be
possible, albeit the correct identification of the activated structures will often give us a good
idea of the tendencies at play and the potential outcomes of the act of choice.
In the natural sciences, natural systems are insulated in experimental situations (that is,
in closed systems that are artificially created) so that underlying structures and
mechanisms are identified, and their individual contribution to events quantitatively
measured and modelled through mathematico-deductivist techniques. The different parts
(for example the ‘modules’) of the human brain, however, cannot be insulated as natural
structures, not only because this would cause severe brain damage, but also because the
activity of most parts depends also on the activity of other parts, and thus the relevant
conception of reality in neural analysis is that of an open system. Patients with brain lesions
provide the closest situation to an insulation of a particular neurobiological structure that
we can find. This is why some of the most important findings concerning the functioning of
particular neurobiological structures were gained through the clinical study of these
patients (on which see Damasio, 1994, 2008). But even these cases do not present
a situation of controllable closure conditions in the same sense that the experimental
manipulation of physical or chemical structures does.
As will be argued here, recent developments in neurobiological and neuropsychological
research seem to support an open system conception of social reality, in which the exact
prediction of the outcome generated by actual behaviour may not be possible—albeit the
identification of tendencies and dispositions caused by the underlying brain structures is
not impossible. But the most fruitful contribution that neuroscience can bring to
economics is in its descriptive potential and not on its predictive ability. That is,
neuroscience can inform economics by providing a detailed study of neurobiological
structures and dispositions, and of the psychological motivations and social structures that
emerge from them, rather than by being combined with the mainstream methodology in
order to attempt to predict events.
The conflicts that may emerge between motivations, and the preference orderings that
are generated as the outcome of underlying structures and dispositions, can then be
addressed in terms of a theory formulated in terms of underlying structures and
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dispositions. In fact, if preferences are recognised to be adaptive, the concept of preference
does not provide (itself alone) a solid ground for a theory of behaviour, for preferences
must themselves be explained in terms of the structures and dispositions that cause their
adaptation.
So the use of neuroscience in economics could be much more fruitful if aimed at the
identification of neurobiological structures, and the psychological and social structures
that emerge from the neurobiological substrate, rather than if aimed at the formulation of
complete preference orderings for each brain state or of deductivist models in general. The
human brain is already sufficiently complicated, and the attempt to provide complex
mathematical models (which presuppose closed systems) in a context of an open system
brings more confusion, rather than clarification, to the study of the human brain and of
human behaviour.
4. The somatic marker hypothesis as a unifying theory
A crucial question to address now is how social behaviour emerges from underlying
neurobiological structures. An answer to such a question requires empirical analysis of the
particular structures under scrutiny. The work of neurologist Antonio Damasio, and his
somatic marker hypothesis, will be used here as a more specific description of the
underlying structures and dispositions behind human behaviour.
A question that could be raised concerns the use of the somatic marker hypothesis as
a framework of analysis. The reason for the use of this framework springs from the fact that
the somatic marker hypothesis is a very broad hypothesis that, due to its abstract nature,
can encompass other more specific theories within its framework. As Bechara and Damasio
(2005) suggest, the somatic marker hypothesis postulates that somatic signals bias our
mental representations of competing options by attaching different emotional charges to
them, thus helping in the computation of various possibilities by emphasising some
possibilities above others and increasing the speed of decision making. The result is an
improvement of the efficiency of our decision-making process. But the specific mecha-
nisms through which this happens are still a matter of further debate.
The somatic marker hypothesis can be seen as a general framework of analysis, which
enables the conceptualisation of decisionmaking as a process where reasoning and decision
making (i) depend on many levels of neural operation, (ii) are supported by underlying
processes (like attention, working memory and emotion) and (iii) depend on the
availability of knowledge about situations, actors, options and outcomes, which is stored
in dispositional form.3
In fact, one of the challenges of the current research in neuroscience and neuro-
economics is how to integrate its various insights into a coherent explanation of human
motivation and behaviour. A possible way to overcome this problem is to provide
a framework for explaining economic decisions that has the potential to include various
streams of research in neuroscience, and in neuroeconomics in particular, within a broader
conceptual scheme. Hence, the somatic marker hypothesis seems an appropriate starting
point with which other branches of research can be fruitfully combined.
One of the key insights provided by the somatic marker hypothesis is that higher order
processes like human reasoning and decision making depend upon lower level bioregu-
latory processes. Hence, the hypothesis can accommodate the research on different
3 For further elaboration, see Bechara et al. (2000, pp. 295–6) or Bechara and Damasio (2005).
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bioregulatory processes (including emotions), and on their influence in reasoning and
decision making within its conceptual framework, where the brain is a layered (and
structured) entity constituted by different levels of bioregulatory processes, in which older
and simpler bioregulatory processes and dispositions give rise to newer and more complex
processes.
Because bioregulatory processes may generate different brain states and motivations,
which will not necessarily correspond to the same preference ordering (andmay indeed lead
to conflicting preferences or incomplete orderings), the key unifying principle for a theory
of human behaviour must be defined in terms of the underlying structures and dispositions
that cause actual behaviour (such as the somatic markers and the structured set of
bioregulatory processes that emerged during a long evolutionary process) and not in terms
of preference orderings, closed systems and the mathematical functions that represent the
latter. Besides, the adaptation of preferences can itself be explained in terms of changes in
the somatic state. I will now describe the somatic market hypothesis in more detail.
5. The human brain and bioregulatory processes
The human brain is the result of a long evolutionary process, during which different
structures evolved and enabled the existence of diverse patterns of response to changes in
the internal functionings of the organism, and to variations in the external environment
that the organism faces.4
Damasio (2003) notes that during this evolutionary process the brain used older and
simpler mechanisms in order to execute more complex functions. For example, brain
circuits used to perform complex functions such as emotions resort upon brain machinery
involved in simpler bioregulatory states. The brain structure evolved thus in a way that
enables it to perform bioregulatory responses of varying degrees of complexity, from the
control of the organism’s metabolism to complex bioregulatory responses such as
emotions.
Damasio (2003) divides the bioregulatory processes of human beings into three different
levels. At the most basic level there are processes that are coordinated by the autonomic
nervous system, such as metabolic processes of the human body (necessary for the
maintenance of life through the transformation of energy sources), the responses of the
immune system and the basic reflexes (including ‘fight or flight’ responses). Regions like
the brain stem and the hypothalamus are key areas in the coordination of these types of
bioregulatory processes.
However, these basic bioregulatory processes are not enough for complex organisms like
human beings to find energy sources. Thus, they give rise to another level of bioregulatory
processes of increasing complexity, through which the organism responds to possible
failures in its internal functionings, such as the lack of energy sources to perform the more
basic bioregulatory processes mentioned above. More complex bioregulatory processes
include pleasure or pain behaviour and the basic impulses (e.g., hunger, thirst or
exploratory behaviour), through which the organism responds to the needs of the
underlying systems.
At a further level of analysis, the organism’s responses include bioregulatory processes
termed as emotions. Emotions are bioregulatory processes that are triggered when regions
of the nervous system such as the amygdala, the cingulated cortex and the ventromedial
4 On the study of the brain as a result of an evolutionary process, see also Paul MacLean (1990).
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prefrontal cortex are stimulated through a sensory cortex. When stimulated, the latter
regions trigger emotional responses, which are then executed through the hypothalamus,
the basal forebrain and the brain stem, causing changes in the bodily state. Afterwards, the
emotional response of the organism, and the changes in the bodily state, are registered in
the somatic sensorial cortices (including the insula), which permanently map the state of
the organism. Damasio (1994, 1999, 2003) makes a distinction between the bodily
responses associated with the execution of emotions, and their mapping by our somatic
sensorial (including the insular) cortices. Only the latter does he designate by the word
‘feeling’, leaving the word ‘emotion’ to denote the bioregulatory process that causes the
‘feeling’.
Damasio (2003) also distinguishes primary emotions from secondary (or social)
emotions. Primary emotions include emotions such as fear, anger, sadness, happiness,
surprise and disgust, and are bioregulatory responses that are similar across all human
beings as long as their neurobiological structures are intact. Primary emotions occur when,
after a stimulus, a given brain area (like the amygdala or the cingulated cortex) is activated,
and triggers regions such as the hypothalamus, the basal forebrain and the brain stem,
which in turn execute the corresponding bodily responses. Again, these responses are
important for the organism’s survival. For example, the amygdala triggers the emotion of
fear when in the presence of threatening stimuli (which are first assessed by association
cortices and high-order cortices), and the execution of the emotion is then processed
through the hypothalamus, the basal forebrain and the brain stem.5This emotion helps the
organism to react to dangerous situations, contributing to its survival.
Secondary emotions include emotions like sympathy, compassion, embarrassment,
shame, guilt, pride, jealousy, envy, gratitude, admiration, indignation and despise.
Secondary emotions are derived from primary emotions, for they depend on the activity
of both the brain machinery involved in primary emotions, and another brain area, namely
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, which is sensitive to contextual and social catego-
risation of external objects and situations. It is through the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
that brain regions like the amygdala are afterwards (and hence indirectly) activated, and the
bodily responses are then executed through the hypothalamus, the basal forebrain and the
brain stem.6
The emergence of a more complex structure of bioregulatory processes that draws upon
more primitive structures of bioregulatory processes is a common feature that appears at
many levels of the organisation of the organism. The hypothalamus and the brain stem,
which are responsible for the most basic bioregulatory responses of the autonomic nervous
system, are the means through which primary emotions will be executed. In a similar way,
secondary (or social) emotions will use the biological machinery of primary emotions,
which is triggered by the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. At a further level of complexity,
we find planning and reasoning, which are crucial for survival, but again rely on lower level
mechanisms, as will be discussed in the next section.
6. Knowledge, memory and somatic markers
Knowledge of objects, facts, persons and situations must be kept active for some time in
order to be processed. The latter role is undertaken by the prefrontal cortex, which is the
5 On the role of the amygdala and the emotion of fear, see also Joseph LeDoux (1996).
6 For a comparison of the roles of the amygdala and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex in decision making,
see Bechara et al. (1999).
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main site for our working memory. The dorsolateral region of the prefrontal cortex plays
a crucial role in the cognitive manipulation of knowledge, with its inferior areas being
associated with object memory, while its superior areas are associated with space memory
(Bechara et al., 2000).
Bechara and Damasio (2005, pp. 339–40) name the innate or learned stimuli which
trigger the amygdala as ‘primary inducers’, while the entities generated by the recall of
primary inducers—represented in our working memory—are ‘secondary inducers’ (with
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex being the critical neuroanatomical structure for
secondary inducers). So the working memory plays also a key role in the triggering of
somatic states from secondary inducers.
Cognitive operations are supported by processes like working memory, emotions and
attention. Once more, note how the principle of using older mechanisms to perform more
complex functions applies to cognitive activities as well, for the latter depend on supporting
processes such as attention, working memory and emotions, and the associated brain
machinery.
The ventromedial region of the prefrontal cortex establishes a linkage between
knowledge of objects and situations, and bioregulatory processes, including the emotions
associated with such objects and situations. By containing dispositional linkages between
factual knowledge and bioregulatory states, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex enables us
to learn and anticipate an association between a given social situation and a bioregulatory
state. The neural dispositions of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, which respond to
mental representations (like the representation of a given social situation) by triggering
emotional responses, are the ‘somatic markers’ in Damasio’s (1994) terminology.
For Damasio (1994, p. 174) ‘somatic markers are a special instance of feelings generated
from secondary emotions’, which ‘have been connected, by learning, to predicted future
outcomes of certain scenarios’. They are ‘somatic’ because they originate in bioregulatory
states of the body, and they ‘mark’ a mental image according to the associated feeling. The
somatic marker hypothesis postulates that the way in which somatic signals bias our mental
representation of competing options, by attaching differential feelings to them, improves
the efficiency of our decision-making process.
Thus, our emotions and feelings (more precisely, the brain circuits responsible for
emotional triggering and execution and for the mapping of emotions) also influence
rational decision-making. The ventromedial prefrontal cortex associates positive or
negative bioregulatory states (including positive and negative emotions) to our factual
knowledge of given objects, persons and situations, and biases our decision-making
towards those decisions associated with positive bioregulatory states.
This emotional bias, which makes some objects and situations more salient than others,
is crucial for the efficiency of decision-making, since without the help of emotions our
brain could not process all the existent information. So emotions, rather than being
a disturbance of rational thinking, are in fact constitutive of, and essential to, rational
thinking. Damasio (1994) argues that the brain can bypass the complete execution of the
bodily response associated with an emotion when the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
directly activates the somatic sensorial cortex (including the insula), which monitors our
bioregulatory state, without actually causing the corresponding changes in our body. This
mechanism makes decision-making a more efficient process.
Some dispositions, such as those implied in the most basic bioregulatory systems, are
mostly innate. Damasio (1994, p. 104) argues that innate knowledge is based in
dispositional representations in the hypothalamus, the brain stem and the limbic system
Can neuroscience inform economics? 9 of 17
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(including the cingulate gyrus, the basal forebrain and the amygdala, although the latter
also contains dispositions that change, especially in the first years of life). But other
dispositions are mostly acquired through our particular experiences and social interaction,
such as (i) the dispositions of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, which establish links
between social situations and the associated somatic sensorial maps of bodily states (i.e.,
the somatic markers), (ii) our dispositional knowledge about ourselves and the facts of our
life and (iii) dispositions located in higher-order cortices in general.
Since the brain areas involved in primary emotions contain mostly innate dispositions,
they remain relativelymore stable throughout our adult life than the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex, which relies more on acquired dispositions. Since the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
categorises external objects and situations (including social contexts), our reaction towards
social situations, and our secondary emotions, can change through our lifetime more easily
than primary emotions. The fact that our dispositional knowledge about facts, objects and
social situations also changes introduces an additional variability to this process.
7. Consciousness and moral behaviour
Damasio (1999) argues that the principle of using older mechanisms and dispositions to
perform more complex functions can also be applied to the explanation of our
consciousness. He distinguishes between three levels: the proto-self, the nuclear self and
the autobiographical self. The proto-self consists in the neural patterns that regions like the
brain stem, the hypothalamus (which regulates the organic biochemistry), the basal
forebrain and somatic sensorial cortices produce to map our organism as we interact with
the environment.
The maps that the proto-self uses are designated by Damasio (1999) as ‘first order
maps’. However, the proto-self does not have the capacity to perceive itself. Changes in the
first order maps of the proto-self are registered in ‘second order maps’, which monitor the
relation between the organism and the object, which causes changes in the organism’s first
order maps (that is, in the proto-self). Second order maps are produced by regions like the
thalamus, the cingulated cortex and the superior colliculus, and contain non-verbal images
of the way in which the organism is changed by the object. These second order maps
produce what Damasio (1999) calls our ‘nuclear consciousness’, which gives us our sense
of being here and now (interacting with an object at a given time), but provides no sense of
our past, nor any capability to anticipate our future actions.
As the nuclear self interacts with objects, higher order cortices (including the frontal and
temporal cortex) and subcortical nuclei (including the amygdala) store dispositional knowledge
about these objects (including facts, experiences and past situations), which can be reactivated
asmemories through convergence zones that group together to disperse information. Damasio
(1999) designates this set of past experiences of the individual, which can be reactivated at
any moment as images and motor responses, as the ‘autobiographical self ’. However, for
these memories to be processed, the dispositional neural patterns that support our images
of objects must be kept active for some time, so that the brain can process it as if the object
were again present to us— while engaging secondary inducers. As noted before, our
working memory, located in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, maintains representations
of the memorised objects long enough for them to be processed.
The way in which the ‘self ’ interacts with other human agents depends upon dispositions
that enable the simulation of somatic sensorial states in our body when we observe other
people in particular situations. Damasio (2003) designates the capacity for such simulation
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as ‘empathy’. The mechanism through which we empathise with others is the following:
when observing another person in a particular situation, certain regions, like the prefrontal
and pre-motor cortex, send direct signals to the somatic sensorial regions that map our
body state (where the insular cortex seems to play a crucial role), representing the action or
emotion that the other person displays as if it were our own.
The neurons that perform this function are designated as ‘mirror neurons’, since they
‘mirror’ the other person’s state as if it were our own body state. But the emotion that
would correspond to this somatic sensorial state is not necessarily executed in our body.
Therefore, the brain state that is generated through mirror neurons, in the somatic
sensorial regions that map our body state, need not correspond to the actual state of our
body, and is thus a simulation.7
Empathy is essential to social cognition, and to the social interaction of ourselves with
other agents. In fact, it is through empathy that another level of complexity arises, namely
the level of socio-psychological structures, which shape social activity, and lead us from
neuroscience to the field of social theory. Damasio (2003) names this further level of
complexity as the ‘moral’ level. The somatic marker hypothesis is a most useful framework
for understanding the neurobiological capacities and dispositions that enable the
emergence of social and moral behaviour as another level of analysis that is not reducible
to neurobiological causation. In fact, much research on neuroeconomics has addressed
topics such as empathy and reciprocity too, providing insights that can be integrated within
the overall framework provided by the somatic marker hypothesis. This topic will now be
addressed in the next section.
8. Social behaviour and social cognition
One example of an important development in neuroeconomics, which can be integrated
within Damasio’s explanation of how social activity emerges from neurobiological
structures, concerns the role of trust in rational deliberation. In mainstream game theory,
cooperation is often explained as the outcome of rational (strategic) deliberation. However,
much research in neuroeconomics has shown how the release of molecules like oxytocin
through the pituitary gland of the hypothalamus is involved in affective bonding, maternal
behaviour and trust, leading agents to engage in cooperative behaviour even when
‘rational’ (strategic) deliberation would lead to a non-cooperative response (see Kosfeld
et al., 2005, or Zak et al., 2005).
Damasio (2003) notes that the release of molecules like oxytocin through the pituitary
gland of the hypothalamus is also crucial for survival, since it directs human beings towards
group solidarity, thus protecting them from external threats (for human beings are more
likely to survive in group than in isolation). Damasio (1994) also notes that the
concentration of serotonin in regions like the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and amygdala
has been found to be positively correlated with cooperative behaviour and the inhibition of
aggressive behaviour. The interaction of serotonin with other systems and neurotransmit-
ters (like dopamine, norepinephrine or acetylcholine) is also an important part of this
process (see Damasio, 1994, pp. 76–8).
Knoch et al. (2006, p. 831) also found that the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is
‘crucial in implementing fairness behaviours by overriding self-interested impulses’, which
7 On the role of mirror neurons and the activation of the insula in social contexts, see Wicker et al. (2003)
and also Gallese et al. (2004).
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means that reciprocity relies not only upon a positive emotional state towards others
induced by emotion-executing regions like the hypothalamus, but also on the capacity of
higher order structures like the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex to exercise top-down (or
executive) control. Here, we have different brain systems, which generate conflicting
motivations, and the outcome (e.g., whether the agent cooperates or not) will be
conditional on the somatic state of the agent.
Social cognition in general depends not only upon what was termed above as
‘empathy’—the activation of our somatic sensorial regions through ‘mirror neurons’,
which make us simulate in our somatic sensorial cortex the emotional states we observe in
other agents—but also on the ability to ‘mentalise’. To have the ability to mentalise is to be
able to represent the psychological perspective of another person, that is, to make
attributions about the mental states of another person, such as about the desires, beliefs or
intentions of another person (see Amodio and Frith, 2006; Singer and Fehr, 2005). The
medial frontal cortex (including the anterior cingulated cortex), together with the
temporoparietal junction, the superior temporal sulcus and the temporal poles, have been
found to play an important role in this process.
The neurobiological substrate that enables ‘mentalising’, together with the neurobio-
logical substrate that enables ‘empathy’, described above, constitutes a key element to the
explanation of how social and moral behaviour emerges. A most helpful step in developing
the framework of the somatic marker hypothesis would in fact be to integrate the research
on ‘mentalising’ and ‘empathy’ with the research on somatic markers in order to explain
the interplay between the human agent’s somatic markers and the social structures that
emerge. This leads to a conception of the human agent that contrasts with the conception
of instrumental rationality driven by self-interest that has been a central element of
mainstream economic theory.
9. Self-interest, prudence and rationality
The conception that arises in the somatic marker hypothesis is one in which changes in
somatic states, and emotions, play an important role in decision making and in shaping
social behaviour. Ashraf et al. (2005) argue that neuroeconomics, and behavioural
economics in general, point towards a return to Adam Smith’s (2002) conception of an
human agent driven by a variety of moral sentiments. It is certainly true that there are many
connections between Smith’s analysis of moral sentiments and a neuroscience-informed
study of emotions. In fact, notions addressed in neuroscience, such as ‘empathy’ and
‘mentalising’, are very similar to ideas presented by Adam Smith (2002), such as Smith’s
notion of ‘sympathy’. The use of neuroscience in order to explain how social behaviour
emerges from emotions and sentiments ultimately leads back to a descriptive approach that
underpinned Adam Smith’s (2002) contribution, and was later abandoned by mainstream
economics.
However, it is also true that the more fruitful framework to develop such connections will
not be one in which the preference orderings that are generated by each brain state are
assumed to be complete orderings, or any framework that assumes a closed system that can
be represented through deductivist models aimed at prediction. The interplay between
competing motivations, sentiments and emotions, an essential aspect of Smith’s analysis, is
a crucial aspect that would be lost given the constraints imposed by deductivist modelling.
The way in which mainstream economists attempt to make Smith’s conception
compatible with deductivist modelling consists in assuming that a particular motivation,
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namely self-interest (which is characterised in terms of a single complete preference
ordering), is the more important motivation for Smith’s analysis.8
The motivation of self-interest, which has been traditionally the key motivation for
mainstream economics, and believed by many to be the key motivation behind Smith’s
analysis, can be fruitfully integrated within a broader conception of human agency—as it
was also the case in Smith’s analysis, as Sen (1987) notes, in contrast with the mainstream
interpretation of Smith. In fact, research on neuroscience and neuroeconomics has shown
that there is a complex interplay, and sometimes conflict, between self-interest and
competing motivations.
One example of conflicting motivations, in which self-interest plays a key role, can be
observed when there is a conflict between the pursuit of pleasure on the one hand, and
rational deliberation (be it moral reasoning, or any rational consideration of long-term goals)
on the other hand. The main site for planning and rational deliberation is our prefrontal
cortex (which, remember, also relies on supporting mechanisms such as the ‘somatic
markers’). However, rational deliberation often conflicts with motivations such as pleasure-
seeking, which in turn depends upon specific systems, such as the dopaminergic system.
The dopaminergic system has been found to play an important role in motivations
generated by the desire of reward, through the transfer of dopamine from the ventral
tegmental area and the substantia negra to the nucleus accumbens of the basal forebrain.
The anticipation of a reward, produced by the dopaminergic system, can thus create
a conflict between rational deliberation and pleasure-seeking (see Berridge and Robinson,
1998, 2003).
Bechara and Damasio (2005) argue that the dopaminergic activity that takes place in the
striatum biases somatic states covertly (and hence the dispositions involved are non-
conscious), by changing the threshold for neuronal firing in structures such as the insula,
somatic sensorial cortices S1 and S2, the amygdala and the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex—unlike other systems, which bias the somatic states in an overt way, such as the
serotonergic activity that (Bechara and Damasio, 2005, suggest) takes place through the
anterior cingulate. Thus, decision-making (and subjective well-being) may be affected at
a non-conscious level, biasing what is often taken to be a ‘rational’ decision.
Smith’s notion of prudence, which Sen (1987) discusses extensively, arises from various
motivations concerned not only with self-interest, but also with an ability to restrain self-
interest, and includes not only the ability for reason and understanding, but also for what
Smith (2002) calls ‘self-command’. The ability for reason, understanding and self-
command that Smith and Sen discuss relies much on the suppression that regions from the
neocortex exert on impulses generated in lower level regions. The ability for restraining
from impulses generated by pleasure-seeking behaviour depends on other important
mechanisms, which act in a complex way in combination with other emotions.
Brain circuits that are important for the suppression of pleasure-seeking include not only
regions in the neocortex, such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, but also regions
associated with the emotion of fear. Remember that fear is triggered in the amygdala, and
executed by regions such as the hypothalamus, the brain stem and the basal forebrain.
Somatic sensorial regions map the body state caused by the emotion of fear, generating our
feeling of the emotion (see Damasio, 1994, 1999, 2003). The execution of this
bioregulatory process depends upon the sympathetic system (which in turn relies upon
neurotransmitters such as norepinephrine and acetylcholine, amongst others).
8 See Sen (1987) for a discussion.
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Preference orderings generated by the activation of the emotion of fear will give more
prominence to safety concerns, comparatively to preference orderings that are generated
without such an emotional stimulus. This can lead to a conflict between amotivation that is
driven by safety concerns and other motivations where safety is not a prominent concern,
such as reward-seeking (e.g., when attaining a reward requires a dangerous action).
Although Smith (1776) analysed extensively the impact of agency driven by self-interest,
for Smith self-interest is a motivation that is always present in an interplay with other
motivations, where this interplay is not an accidental perturbation of a well-defined
preference ordering that reflects self-interest, but is in fact constitutive of all human action,
even self-interested action. For example, emotions are not a perturbation of rational
behaviour but, in fact, are essential to decision making, as Damasio argues in his somatic
marker hypothesis.
In fact, if we focus on self-interest, abstracting from other motivations, we need not
consider that the other motivations we are abstracting from do not play a role in self-
interested behaviour too. Abstraction (as defined in Lawson, 1997, 2003) consists in
focusing on one aspect while leaving other aspects aside momentarily, but without
supposing that other things left aside are not playing a role in what is observed. Isolation,
on the other hand, consists in picking up a part of reality while supposing that other things
left aside are not playing a role in the part of reality we are analysing. But when we assume
isolation in a part of reality that is in fact connected to other parts of reality, we are
fictionalising (making a false assumption) rather than abstracting.
Mainstream economists take Smith’s self-interest in isolation from other motivations,
while assuming a single complete preference ordering that describes self- interest, or other
fictional assumptions, in order to obtain closed systems, which render deductivist models
applicable. Much research on neuroeconomics essentially accepts the (false) isolation of
competing motivations, so that deductivist modelling can proceed, although with the
caveat that each complete preference ordering is conditional on a given brain state.
The conception of human agency we arrive at in the light of recent neurobiological
evidence contrasts not only with the postulate that a single complete preference ordering is
sufficient to explain behaviour, but also with the postulate that various complete orderings
act in isolation, and leads to an open system conception of reality, which contrasts with the
presupposition of closed systems that characterises mainstream economics.
10. Concluding remarks
The use of neuroscience in economics has consisted in many cases in the employment of
knowledge from neuroscience in order to obtain more sophisticated models so as to achieve
prediction of events. Although neuroeconomics takes into account the existence of various
motivations and preference orderings, in many cases each of these preference orderings is
taken to act in isolation, within models which differentiate between a ‘rational’ state and an
‘emotional’ state, so that closure conditions are artificially generated (in fact, falsely posited).
This approach is inconsistent with a perspective where rationality cannot be seen as
completely separated from emotions, as in the somatic marker hypothesis. According to the
somatic marker hypothesis, decisions will be biased depending on the emotional charge
associated with each option, where we do not have rational choices on the one hand, and
emotional choices on the other hand, but rather different degrees of rationality and of
(various types of) emotionality in every circumstance. In fact, emotions are essential to the
exercise of reasoning, since if emotions did not make some options more salient, our brain
14 of 17 N. Martins
 b
y
 o
n
 M
a
y
 3
1
, 2
0
1
0
 
h
ttp
://c
je
.o
x
fo
rd
jo
u
rn
a
ls
.o
rg
D
o
w
n
lo
a
d
e
d
 fro
m
 
could not compute all available options, as Damasio argues. Emotions are constitutive of,
and not an absence of, rationality.
Thus, our mental representations and our emotions (and feelings) are strongly
interconnected, and causally interact in both directions. Even the emotions that support
mental representations are themselves interconnected in a complex way. As Damasio
(2003) notes, social (or secondary) emotions, for example, are a result of a complex
interplay between primary emotions and representations of social situations.
Emotions and sentiments are a complex combination of other bioregulatory processes
(including other emotions), which cannot be taken to act in isolation. We do not have a case
of isolated brain circuits, but rather a conception where the interrelations between brain
circuits and the emerging motivations are constitutive of each motivation that arises—we
have a case that Lawson (1997, 2003) terms ‘internal relations’, when the relations
between several entities are constitutive of those entities. While it is true that not all trends
of neuroeconomics engage in deductivist modelling, it is also true that the implications of
the research in neuroscience and neuroeconomics for deductivist modelling have been left
unaddressed, even within neuroeconomics. The explanation of the emergence of co-
operation, social structures, and social behaviour in general, has been constrained by the
failure to realise the limitations of deductivist models for explaining choice, behaviour and
well-being.
The picture that emerges within a broad conception of human motivation, informed by
knowledge of the neurobiological substrate from which social behaviour emerges, is one in
which we can thus distinguish different motivations, which rely upon different brain
systems and circuits, that are not totally independent and which contain neural
dispositions that may change during our lifetime. These motivations play a central role in
our choice process and in our subjective representations of well-being. The neurobiological
evidence about these different motivations contradicts the mainstream use of methods that
presuppose closed systems.
However, the existence of these conflicting motivations does not mean that there cannot
be an integrated and systematic theory of human behaviour. Rather, it means that such
a theory of human behaviour should be formulated not in terms of complete and stable
preference orderings, or any other assumptions that enable the formulation of a closed
system, but rather in terms of the underlying structures and dispositions that cause actual
behaviour—and cause the adaptation of preferences too. Concepts such as ‘somatic
marker’, and the explanation of the brain in terms of the structured set of bioregulatory
processes that were developed during a long evolutionary process, constitute a promising
starting point for a research programme aimed at developing such a systematic theory of
human behaviour.
In fact, different motivations mentioned here, such as physiological motivations, reward-
seeking motivations, trust, empathy or security, all have a common denominator: they
influence choice and behaviour by changing the underlying somatic state of the chooser,
and even rationality is supported by similar mechanisms. The network of somatic markers
identified by Damasio and colleagues can be seen as an underlying structure, or set of
dispositions, in terms of which actual behaviour can be understood. The network of
somatic markers, located in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex is, of course, connected to
a larger hierarchical structure of bioregulatory processes, which support cognition and
motivation, from which social and moral behaviour emerges.
Although much research remains to be done in order to develop the hypothesis
suggested here, the more general form of the overall framework can already be sketched.
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The structure of bioregulatory processes, which supports cognitive and motivational
processes, is a hierarchical structure in which lower level processes and mechanisms
support higher level processes. This hierarchical structure results from the fact that during
a long evolutionary process, the brain has used older and simpler mechanisms in order to
perform more complex functions. From these mechanisms emerges yet another level—the
social realm. This hierarchical structure can accommodate more specific theories
concerning specific subsystems that constitute it.
Social theories, which address the emergent social realm, can also benefit much from an
understanding of the neurobiological basis of social and moral activity. In fact, the use of
Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis within economic analysis points towards a return to
Adam Smith’s (2002) approach which, like Damasio’s, aimed at identifying a set of moral
sentiments (and social emotions) as the central concepts for a theory of social and moral
behaviour.
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